Interview with Norman Dodd: The Hidden Agenda (1982)

In 1982, G. Edward Griffin interviewed Norman Dodd, a banker and the Director of Research of the 1953 Congressional Select Committee investigating the political activities of tax-exempt foundations.

G. Edward Griffin interviewed Norman Dodd in 1982, a banker and the research director of the 1953 US Congressional Select Committee investigating the political activities of tax-exempt foundations. Norman Dodd revealed both in this interview and in the “Dodd Report” that the major foundations were pursuing an agenda that had little to do with charity. It was (and arguably still is) about changing America's character from individualism to collectivism and creating a world government.

German translation

Preface by G. Edward Griffin

The story you are about to hear, represents a missing piece in the puzzle of modern history. Without this knowledge, many contemporary events are simply beyond understanding. You are about to hear a man tell you, that the major Tax Exempt Foundations of this land, since at least 1945, have been operating to promote a hidden agenda. That agenda has nothing to do with the surface appearance of charity, good works or philanthropy. This man will tell you, that the real objectives include the creation of a worldwide collective estate, including the Soviet Union, which is to be ruled from behind the scenes by those same interests, which now control the Tax Exempt Foundations.

The man who tells this story, is none other than Mr. Norman Dodd, who in 1954 was the staff director of the Congressional special Committee to investigate Tax Exempt Foundations. Sometimes referred to as the Reece Committee, in recognition of its Chairman, congressman Carroll Reece. The interview you're about to see, was conducted by me in 1982. I had no immediate use for the material at that time, but I realized that Mr. Dodd's story was of extreme importance and since he was advanced in age and not in good health, I simply wanted to capture his recollections on videotape, while he was still with us. It was a wise decision, because Mr. Dodd did pass away just a short time afterward. In recent months, there has been a resurgence of interest in the substance of Mr. Dodd's story and we have decided to make it available to the general public. So what now follows, is the full unedited interview, broken occasionally only for a tape change or to emit the sound of a passing airplane. It stands on its own, as an important piece in the puzzle of modern history.

Interview

G. Edward Griffin: Mr. Dodd, let's begin this interview by a brief statement for the record, telling us who you are, what your background is and your qualifications to speak on this subject.

Norman Dodd: Well Mr. Griffin, as for who I am. I am, just as the name implies, an individual, born in New Jersey and educated in private schools. Eventually in the school called Andover Massachusetts and then Yale University. Running through my whole period of being brought up, growing up, I have been an indefatigable reader and I have had one major interest and that was this country, as I was led to believe, it was originally founded. I entered the world of business, knowing absolutely nothing about how that world operated and realized that the only way to find out what that world was consisted of, would be to become part of it.

I then acquired some experience in the manufacturing world and then in the world of international communication and finally chose banking as the field I wished to devote my life to.

I was fortunate enough to secure a position in one of the important banks in New York and lived there. I lived through the conditions which led up to, what is known as the crash of 1929 and I witnessed what led to a collapse of the structure of the United States as a whole and much to my surprise I was confronted by my superiors with a.. in the middle of the panic, in which they were immersed. I was confronted with the question: “Norm, what do we do now?”

I was 30 at the time and I had no more right to have an answer to that question than the man in the moon. However, I did manage to say to my superiors: "Gentlemen, you take this experience as proof to something that you do not know about banking and you better go find out what that something is and act accordingly."

Four days later, I was confronted by the same superiors, with a statement to the effect that: "Norm, you go find out." I really was fool enough to accept that assignment, because it meant that you were going out to search for something and nobody could tell you what you were looking for. But I felt so strongly on the subject that I consented to it. I was relieved of all normal duties inside the bank and two and a half years later I felt that it was possible to report back to those who had given me this assignment.

So I rendered such a report and as a result of the report I rendered, I was told the following: "Norm, what you're saying is, we should return to sound banking." I said: "Yes, in essence, that's exactly what I'm saying." Whereupon I got my first shock, which was a statement from them to this effect: “We will never see sound banking in the United States again.” They cited chapter and verse to support that statement and what they cited was as follows: "Since the end of World War I, we have been responsible for, what they call, the institutionalizing of conflicting interests." They are so prevalent inside this country, that they can never be resolved.

This came to me as an extraordinary shock, because the men who made this statement, were men who were deemed as the most prominent bankers in the country. The bank of which I was a part, was spoken of as a Morgan Bank and coming from men of that caliber, a statement of that kind, made a tremendous impression on me. The type of impression that it made on me was, I wondered if I, as an individual, in what they call a junior officer of the bank, could, with the same enthusiasm, foster the progress and the policies of the bank.

I spent about a year trying to think this out and came to the conclusion that I would have to resign. I did resign and as a consequence of that had this experience: when my letter of resignation reached the desk of the President of the bank, he sent for me and I came to visit with him and he stated to me: "Norm, I have your letter, but I don't believe you understand what's happened in the last 10 days." I said: "No, Mr. Cochran, I have no idea what's happened." "Well," he said, "the directors have never been able to get your report to them out of their mind and as a result they have decided that you as an individual must begin at once and you must reorganize this Bank in keeping with your own ideas." He then said: "Now, can I tear up your letter?"

In as much as what had been said to me was, offering me at the age of by then 33, about as fine an opportunity for service to the country as I could imagine. I said yes and they said they wish me to begin at once. I did and suddenly in the span of about six weeks, I was not permitted to do another piece of work. Every time I brought the subject up, I was kind of patted on the back and told: "Stop worrying about it Norm, pretty soon you'll be a Vice-President and then you will have quite a handsome salary and ultimately be able to retire on a very worthwhile pension. In the meantime you can play golf and tennis to your content on weekends."

Well Mr. Griffin, I found I couldn't do it. I spent a year with, figuratively, my feet on the desk, doing nothing and I just couldn't adjust to it, so I did resign. This time my resignation stuck and then I got my second shock. Which was the discovery that the doors of every bank in the United States were closed to me and I never could get a job, as it were, in the bank. So I found myself, for the first time since I graduated from college, out of a job and from there on I followed various branches of the financial world, ranging from Investment Council, to membership with Stock Exchange and finally ended up as an advisor to a few individuals who had capital funds to look after.

In the meantime my major interest became very specific, which was to endeavor by some means of getting the educational world to actually, you might say, teach the subject of economics realistically and move it away from the support of various speculative activities that characterize our country. I have had that interest and you know how, as you generate a specific interest, you find yourself gravitating toward persons with similar interests and ultimately I found myself gone to the center of the world of dissatisfaction, with the direction that this country was headed.

That's on one direction and this same way I found myself in contact with many individuals, who on their own had done a vast amount of studying and research, in areas which were part of the problem and...

G. Edward Griffin: If I may interrupt here for a second, at what point in your career did you become connected with the Reece Committee?

Norman Dodd: 1953.

G. Edward Griffin: What was that capacity, Sir?

Norman Dodd: That was a capacity of what they call Director of Research for the Reece Committee.

G. Edward Griffin: Can you tell us what the Reece Committee was attempting to do?

Norman Dodd: Yes, I can tell you. It was operating and carrying out instructions, embodied in a resolution passed by the House of Representatives, which was to investigate the activities of Foundations, as to whether or not these activities could justifiably be labeled unamerican. Without, I might say, defining what they meant by unamerican, but that was the resolution. The Committee had then the task of selecting a Council and the Council in turn had the task of selecting a staff. He had to have somebody who would direct the work of that staff. That was what they meant by the Director of Research.

G. Edward Griffin: What were some of the details, the specifics that you told the Committee at that time?

Norman Dodd: Well Mr. Griffin, in that report I specifically, number one, defined what was to us, what was meant by the phrase unamerican? We defined that in our way as being: a determination to effect changes in the country by unconstitutional means. We have plenty of constitutional procedures, assuming that we wish to effect a change in the form of government and that sort of thing. Therefore, any effort in that direction which did not avail itself of the procedures which were authorized by the Constitution, could be justifiably called unamerican. That was the start of educating them up to that particular point. The next thing was to educate them as to the effect on the country as a whole, of the activities of large endowed Foundations over the then past 40 years.

G. Edward Griffin: What was that effect, Sir?

Norman Dodd: That effect was to orient our educational system away from support of the principles embodied in the Declaration of Independence and implemented in the Constitution and educate them over to the idea that the task now was, as a result of the orientation of education, away from these briefly stated principles and self-evident truths. That's what had been the effect of the wealth, which kind of constituted the endowments of those Foundations that had been in existence over the largest portion of the span of 50 years and holding them responsible for this change. What we were able to bring forward was, that what we had uncovered, was a determination of these large, endowed Foundations, through their trustees, to actually get control over the content of American education.

G. Edward Griffin: There's quite a bit of publicity given to your conversation with Rowan Gaither. Would you please tell us who he was and what was that conversation you had with him?

Norman Dodd: Rowan Gaither was at that time president of the Ford Foundation and Mr. Gaither had sent for me, when I found it convenient to be in New York. Asked me to call upon him at his office, which I did. On arrival, after a few amenities, Mr. Gaither said:

"Mr. Dodd, we've asked you to come up here today, because we thought that possibly, off the record, you would tell us why the Congress is interested in the activities of Foundations such as ourselves?"

Before I could think of how I would reply to that statement, Mr. Gaither then went on voluntarily and stated:

"Mr Dodd, all of us that have a hand in the making of policies here, have had experience, either with the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) during the war or the European Economic Administration, after the war. We've had experience operating under directives and these directives emanate and did emanate from the White House. Now we still operate under just such directives. Would you like to know what the substance of these directives is?"

I said: "Yes, Mr. Gaither, I'd like very much to know." Whereupon he made this statement to me, namely:

"Mr. Dodd, we all here operate in response to similar directives, the substance of which is that: we shall use our grant-making power, so to alter life in the United States, that it can be comfortably merged with the Soviet Union."

Well, parenthetically Mr. Griffin, I nearly fell off he chair. Of course I didn't, but my response to Mr. Gaither then was:

"Oh Mr Gaither, I can now answer your first question. You forced the Congress of the United States to spend 150.000 dollars to find out what you've just told me. Of course legally, you're entitled to make grants for this purpose, but I don't think you're entitled to withhold that information from the people of the country, to whom you're indebted for your Tax Exemption. So why don't you tell the people of the country what you told me?"

His answer was: "We would not think of doing any such thing." So then I said:

"Well Mr. Gaither, obviously you forced the Congress to spend this money in order to find out what you've just told me."

G. Edward Griffin: Mr. Dodd, you have spoken before, about some interesting things that were discovered by Katherine Casey at the Carnegie Endowment. Can you tell us that story, please?

Norman Dodd: Yes, I'm glad to Mr. Griffin. This experience that you have just referred to, came about in response to a letter which I had written to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, asking certain questions from gathering certain information. On the arrival of that letter, Dr. Johnson, who was then president of the Carnegie Endowment, telephoned me and said, did I ever come up to New York? I said, "yes I did. More or less each weekend." He said: "Well, when you're next here, will you drop in and see us?" Which I did. Again on arrival at the office of the Endowment, I found myself in the presence of Dr. Joseph Johnson, the President, who was a successor to Alger Hiss, two Vice Presidents and their own Council, a partner in the firm, Sullivan & Cromwell. Dr. Johnson said, after again amenities:

"Mr. Dodd, we have your letter, we can answer all those questions. But it would be a great deal of trouble and we have a counter suggestion and our counter suggestion is that: if you can spare a member of your staff for two weeks and send that member up to New York, we will give to that member a room in the library and the minute books of this Foundation since its inception. We think that whatever you want to find out, or the Congress wants to find out, will be obvious from those minutes."

Well, my first reaction was they lost their mind. I had a pretty good idea of what those minutes would contain, but I realized that Dr. Johnson had only been in office two years and the other, the Vice Presidents, were relatively young men and Council seemed to be also a young man. I guessed that probably they never read the minutes themselves. So I said I had somebody, I would take it.

I would accept their offer and I went back to Washington and I selected the member of my staff, who was on my staff, having been a practicing attorney in Washington. But she was on my staff to proceed to it that I didn't break any congressional procedures or rules, in addition to which, she was unsympathetic to the purpose of the investigation. She was a level-headed and a very reasonably brilliant, capable lady and her attitude toward the investigation was: what could possibly be wrong with Foundations? They do so much good.

Well, in the face of that sincere conviction of Katherine's, I went out of my way not to prejudice her in any way, but I did explain to her that she couldn't possibly cover 50 years of handwritten minutes in two weeks, so she would have to do what we call spot reading and I blocked out certain periods of time to concentrate on. Off she went to New York. She came back at the end of two weeks with the following, recorded on dictaphone belts:

We are now at the year 1908, which was the year that the Carnegie began operations. In that year the trustees, meeting for the first time, raised a specific question, which they discussed throughout the balance of the year, in a very learned fashion. The question is: Is there any means known, more effective than war, assuming you wish to alter the life of an entire people? They conclude that: No more effective means than war, to that end, is known to humanity. So then in 1909 they raise the second question and discuss it, namely: How do we involve the United States in a war?

Well I doubt, at that time, if there was any subject more removed from the thinking of most of the people of this country, than its involvement in a war. There were intermittent shows in the Balkans, but I doubt very much if many people even knew where the Balkans were. Then finally they answer that question as follows:

“We must control the State Department.”

Then that very naturally raises the question of How do we do that? They answer it by saying:

"We must take over and control the diplomatic machinery of this country."

Finally they resolve to aim at that as an objective. Then time passes and we are eventually in a war, which would have been World War I. At that time, they record on their minutes, a shocking report, in which they dispatch to President Wilson a telegram cautioning him to see that the war does not end too quickly. Finally of course the war is over. At that time, their interest shifts over to preventing, what they call, a reversion of life in the United States to what it was prior to 1914, when World War I broke out. They arrive at that point, they come to the conclusion that:

“To prevent a reversion, we must control education in the United States.”

They realize that that's a pretty big task, so to them it's too big for them alone, so they approach the Rockefeller Foundation, with the suggestion that: that portion of Education which could be considered domestic, be handled by the Rockefeller Foundation and that portion which is international, should be handled by the Endowment. They then decide that the key to the success of these two operations, lay in the alteration of the teaching of American history. So they approach four of the then most prominent teachers of American history in the country. People like Charles and Mary Beard and their suggestion to them is: will they alter the manner in which they present this subject and they get turned down flat.

So they then decide that it is necessary for them to do as they say: build our own stable of historians. Then they approach the Guggenheim Foundation, which specializes in Fellowships and say: when we find young men in the process of studying for doctorates in the field of American history and we feel that they are the right caliber, will you grant them Fellowships on our say-so? The answer is yes. So under that condition, eventually they assembled 20 and they take this 20 potential teachers of American history to London and there they're briefed into what is expected of them, when, as and if they secure appointments in keeping with the doctorates they will have earned.

That group of 20 historians ultimately becomes a nucleus of the American Historical Association. Then toward the end of the 1920s, the Endowment grants to the American Historical Association, 400,000 Dollars for a study of our history, in a manner which points to: what can this country look forward to in the future? That culminates in a 7-volume study, the last volume of which is, of course, in essence, a summary of the contents of the other six. The essence of the last volume is: the future of this country belongs to collectivism, administered with characteristic American efficiency. That's the story that ultimately grew out of and of course was, what could have been presented by the members of this congressional Committee to the Congress as a whole, for just exactly what it said. It never got to that point.

G. Edward Griffin: This is the story that emerged from the minutes of the Carnegie Fund?

Norman Dodd: That's right. It was official to that extent.

G. Edward Griffin: Catherine Casey had brought all of these back in the form of dictated notes or verbatim readings of the minutes?

Norman Dodd: On dictaphone belts.

G. Edward Griffin: Are those in existence today?

Norman Dodd: I don't know. If they are, they're somewhere in the archives under the control of the Congress, House of Representatives.

G. Edward Griffin: How many people actually heard those or were they typed up, transcripts made?

Norman Dodd: No.

G. Edward Griffin: How many people actually heard those recordings?

Norman Dodd: Oh, three maybe. Myself, my top assistants and Catherine. Yeah, I might tell you this experience, as far as its impact on Catherine Casey is concerned, she never was able to return to her law practice. If it hadn't been for Carroll Reece's ability to tuck her away in a job at the Federal Trade Commission, I don't know what would have happened to Catherine, but ultimately she lost her mind as a result of it. Terrible shock to her. It's a very rough experience to encounter proof of these kinds.

G. Edward Griffin: Mr. Dodd, can you summarize the opposition to the Committee, the Reece Committee, and particularly the efforts to sabotage the Committee?

Norman Dodd: Well, they began right at the start of the work of it, of an operating staff, Mr. Griffin. It began on the day on which the Committee met, for the purpose of consenting to our confirming my appointment to the position of Director of Research. Thanks to the abstention of the minority members of the Committee, that is the two Democratic members, from voting, why technically I was unanimously appointed.

G. Edward Griffin: Wasn't the White House involved in opposition?

Norman Dodd: Not at this particular point, Sir. Mr. Reece ordered Council and myself to visit Wayne Hays. Wayne Hays was the ranking minority member of the Committee as a Democrat. So we, Council and I, had to go down to Mr. Hays office, which we did. Mr. Hays greeted us with the flat statement, directed primarily to me, which is that:

“I am opposed to this investigation. I regard it as nothing but an effort on the part of Carroll Reece to gain a little prominence, so I'll do everything I can to see that it fails.”

Well, I am kind of a strange personality, in the sense that the challenge of that nature interests me. Our Council withdrew, he went over and sat on a couch in Mr. Reece's office and pouted. But, I sort of took up this statement of Hays as a challenge and set myself the goal of winning him over to our point of view. I started by noticing on his desk, there was a book and the book was of type that, there are many in these days, that would be complaining about the spread of Communism in Hungary, it's that type of book. This meant to me that, at least Hays read a book. So, I brought up the subject of this spread of the influence of the Soviet world and for two hours discussed this with Hays and finally ended up with his rising from his desk and saying: "Norm, if you will carry this investigation toward the goal as you've outlined it to me, I'll be your biggest supporter." I said: "Mr. Hays, I can assure you, I will not double-cross you."

Subsequently, Mr. Hays sent word to me, that he was in the Bethesda Hospital with an attack of ulcers, but would I come and see him? Which I did. He then said: "Norm, the only reason I've asked you to come out here is, I just want to hear you say again: you will not double-cross me." I gave him that assurance and that was the basis of our relationship. Meantime, Council took the attitude expressed in these words: "Norm, if you want to waste your time with this guy, as he called him, you can go ahead and do it, but don't ever ask me to say anything to him, under any condition, on any subject." So, in a sense, that cleared the tracks for me to operate in relation to Hays on my own.

As time passed, Hays offered friendship, which I hesitated to accept, because of his vulgarity and I didn't want to get mixed up with him socially, under any condition. Well, that was our relationship for about three months and then eventually, I had occasion to add to my staff and as a result of adding to my staff, a top-flight intelligence officer. Both the Republican National Committee and the White House were resorted to, to stop me from continuing this investigation, in the direction Carroll Reece had personally asked me to do.

Which was to utilize this investigation, Mr. Griffin, to uncover the fact, that this country had been the victim of a conspiracy. That was Mr. Reece's conviction, I eventually agreed to carry it out. I explained to Mr. Reece that his own Council wouldn't go in that direction. He gave me permission to disregard our own Council and I had then to set up an aspect of the investigation outside of our office, more or less secret. The Republican National Committee got wind of what I was doing and they did everything they could to stop me. They appealed to Council to stop me and finally they resorted to the White House.

G. Edward Griffin: Was there objection because of what you were doing or because of the fact that you were doing it outside of the official auspices of the Committee?

Norman Dodd: No, their objection was, as they put it, my devotion to what they call anti-semitism. That was a cooked up idea, but in other words, it wasn't true at all. But anyway, that's the way they expressed it. They made it stick.

G. Edward Griffin: Excuse me. Why did they do that? How could they say that?

Norman Dodd: Well, they could say it Mr. Griffin, but they had to have something in the way of rationalization of their decision, to do everything they could to stop the completion of this investigation in the direction that it was moving, which would have been an exposure of this Carnegie Endowment story and the Ford Foundation and the Guggenheim and the Rockefeller Foundation, all working in harmony toward the control of education in the United States.

Well, in any event, to secure the help of the White House in the picture, they got the White House to cause the liaison personality between the White House and the (Capitol) Hill, a major person, to go up to Hays and try to get him to, as it were, actively oppose, what investigation was engaged in. Hays very kindly then would listen to this visit from major person. Then he would call me and say: "Norm, come up to my office, I have a good deal to tell you." I would go up, he'd tell me: "I just had a visit from major person and he wants me to break up this investigation." So I then say: "Well Wayne, what did you do, what did you say to him?" He said: "I just told him to get the hell out." He did that three times and I got pretty proud of him, in the sense that he was, as it were, backing me up. We finally embarked upon hearings at Hays request, because he wanted to get them out of the way before he went abroad after the summer.

G. Edward Griffin: Why were the hearings finally terminated, what happened to the Committee? What happened to the Committee or the hearings?

Norman Dodd: Oh, the hearings were terminated. Carroll Reece was up against such a furore as Hays. Through the activity of our own Council, Hays became convinced that he was being double-crossed and he put on a show in a public hearing room, Mr. Griffin. That was an absolute disgrace and he called Caroll Reece publicly every name in the book and Mr. Reece took this as proof that he couldn't couldn't continue the hearings. He actually invited me to accompany him when he went down to Hays office and in my presence, with the tears rolling down his face, Hays apologized to Carroll Reece for what he'd done, his conduct and apologized to me and I thought that would be enough and Carroll would resume. But he never did.

G. Edward Griffin: The charge of anti-semitism is kind of intriguing to me. What was the basis of that charge?

Norman Dodd: The basis that the Republican National Committee used, was that the intelligence officer I'd taken on my staff, when I oriented this investigation to the exposure of and proof of a conspiracy, was known to have a book and the book was deemed to be anti-semitic. This was childish, but this was the second in command at the Republican National Committee and he told me I would have to dismiss this person from my staff.

G. Edward Griffin: Who was that person?

Norman Dodd: A Colonel Lee Lorraine.

G. Edward Griffin: What was his book, do you recall?

Norman Dodd: The book they referred to was called Waters Flowing Eastward, which was a very castigation of the Jewish influence in the world.

G. Edward Griffin: What were some of the other charges made by Mr. Hays against Mr. Reece?

Norman Dodd: Oh, just that Mr. Reece was utilizing this investigation for his own prominence inside the House of Representatives. That was the only charge that Hays could think of.

G. Edward Griffin: How would you describe the motivation of the people who created the Foundations? The big Foundations, in the very beginning, what was their motivation?

Norman Dodd: Their motivation, well, let's take Mr. Carnegie as an example. His publicly declared and steadfast interest, was to counteract the departure of the colonies from Great Britain. He was devoted to just putting the pieces back together again.

G. Edward Griffin: Would that have required the collectivism that they were dedicated to?

Norman Dodd: No. No. No. These policies are the foundations' allegiance to these un-American concepts; these policies are all traceable to the transfer of the funds over into the hands of Trustees, Mr. Griffin. Those Trustees were not the men who had a hand in the creation of the wealth that led to the endowment, or the use of that wealth for what we would call public purposes.

G. Edward Griffin: It was a subversion of the original intent then?

Norman Dodd: Oh yeah, completely so. We got into the world traditionally of bankers and lawyers.

G. Edward Griffin: How do you see that the purpose and direction of the major Foundations has changed over the years to the present? What is it today?

Norman Dodd: 100 percent behind meeting the cost of education, such as it is presented through the schools and colleges of the United States, on the subject of: our history has proven our original ideas to be no longer practical. The future belongs to a collectivistic concept and that there's no disagreement on it.

G. Edward Griffin: Why do the Foundations generously support communist causes in the United States?

Norman Dodd: Well, because to them Communism represents a means of developing, what we call a monopoly. As the organization, we'll say, of large-scale industry into an administrable unit.

G. Edward Griffin: Do they think that they will be one day...?

Norman Dodd: They will be the beneficiaries of it, yes.